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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent# 
v. 
JOHNNY WADE DRAWN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890253-CA 
Priority No. 13 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals fail to comply with 
controlling case law and omit necessary facts appearing in the 
record in finding that Mr. Drawn's right to confrontation was not 
violated when Officer Ron Edwards recited from memory the 
I 
custodial statements of two accomplices who did not testify at 
trial? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals apply the wrong standard of 
review and misstate necessary facts in the record in finding that 
the unduly suggestive in-court identification did not violate due 
process because the witness had an independent recollection of 
Mr. Drawn? 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT 
Copies of the Court of Appeals• 
denying rehearing, from which order Judge 
are included in Appendix 1.1 
OF APPEALS 
decision and the order 
Orme dissented in part, 
1 Judge Orme dissented from the order denying rehearing 
on the first issue raised in the petition for rehearing, relating 
to the violation of Mr. Drawn's right to Confrontation (discussed 
in question 1 of this petition), indicating that he would ask for 
further briefing from the State on that issue. 
1 
because the testimony of Officer Edwards and the prosecutor 
established the unavailability of the witnesses, and because the 
statements qualified as "statements against penal interest" (S.H. 
43-44, T. 48). Officer Edwards' testimony concerning the 
statements is included in Appendix 3. 
In affirming the admission of Officer Edwards' 
testimony, the Court of Appeals failed to mention that when 
Officer Edwards began reciting what he recalled of the custodial 
statements, the trial court interrupted and instructed the 
jurors, 
Obviously the testimony that he is 
referring to as to that which she said is 
hearsay. Prior to this hearing the court has 
ruled, however, the unavailability of those 
witnesses — there was appropriate effort, 
the court has found, by the law enforcement 
agencies to locate those witnesses which 
makes it possible that the officer may 
testify and you may [ac]cept that as though 
that witness were testifying. 
(T. 150)(emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals also failed to mention that during 
direct examination of a defense witness, defense counsel was 
prohibited from establishing that Officer Edwards had telephoned 
that witness, misrepresenting that he was calling on behalf of 
defense counsel (T.2 54). Cutting off this line of questioning, 
the trial court raised and sustained a hearsay objection, 
although defense counsel was not attempting to establish the 
truth of the assertion that Officer Edwards was calling on behalf 
of defense counsel (T.2 54). The transcript pages including this 
testimony are included in Appendix 4. 
4 
in finding the hearsay 
The Court of Appeals not only failed to address the 
impact this bolstering and protection of Ofjficer Edwards' 
testimony had on Mr. Drawn1s rights to confrontation, but also 
relied on the testimony of Officer Edwards 
declarants unavailable, 5 and in trusting Ofjficer Edwards1 
representation of the content of the custodial statements in 
characterizing the statements as "against penal interest."6 
2. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
The victim of the robbery, MickiHorn, equivocally 
I 
identified someone other than Mr. Drawn asiher assailant in a 
pretrial line-up including Mr. Drawn (T. 5^), and was unable to 
identify Mr. Drawn in a photograph of the JLine-up (T. 66-67). 
The trial court allowed Micki Horn to identify Mr. Drawn in 
court, as follows: 
Well, when I walked in I saft down and 
he turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And [that was it. 
And everything about him — the features — I 
just ••• it was him. I just couldn't — I 
don't know. But I recognized hiJm. The way 
he moved, the way his back was qver, the 
wrinkles on the forehead, his ndse, 
everything. 
(T. 57-58). 
5 Ic3. at 893-894. It also should be noted that in 
finding that the State met its burden of proving the witnesses 
unavailable, the Court of Appeals relied cf>n the "good faith 
efforts" of the prosecution, in sending subpoenas, some of which 
were repeatedly sent to the wrong address (S.H. 41-42), and which 
subpoenas the prosecutor did not expect tct> be obeyed, inasmuch as 
Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus had disobeyed previous subpoenas (T. 
34-35). 
Id. at 893-894. 
5 
The trial court allowed this in-court identification 
over objection and without any preliminary analysis, stating, "If 
she has any independent recollection she can testify to it." (T. 
57). Pages of the transcript including Ms. Horn's in-court 
identification are included in Appendix 5. 
The Court Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial 
court under the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of 
appellate review.7 
In finding that the in-court identification was unduly 
suggestive, the Court of Appeals was apparently relying on the 
fact that "the identification... was made while defendant was 
sitting at counsel table."8 The Court of Appeals failed to 
mention the additional concern that it appears that Mr. Drawn 
was the only black man wearing shackles at the defense table at 
the time of the identification.9 
In finding that an independent basis for the 
identification existed, the Court of Appeals stated, 
The salesperson's in-court 
identification focused not on defendant's 
face, but rather on his features, movements, 
and forehead wrinkles. In her statement to 
police, made on the day of the robbery, she 
stated that the robber "wasn't white," that 
his "hair and skin was [sic] a little dark," 
and the suspect was possibly hispanic or 
Mexican. Defendant is in fact a light-
7 Drawn at 892-893. 
8 Drawn at 892. 
9 See S.H. 8 "Judge Young: He is certainly going to have 
restraints on during the course of the trial."; T. 2 trial 
counsel was James Valdez; Drawn at 892 (Mr. Drawn is black). 
6 
skinned black man. The witness was also 
looking at his face "the whole time" dUring 
the robbery. There is no serious 
inconsistency between the prior description 
and the subsequent in-court ident 
make the identification unreliabl 
ification to 
le. 
791 P.2d at 892 (emphasis added). 
The transcript indicates that Ms Horn's opportunity to 
view her assailant's face was much more limited than indicated by 
the Court of Appeals. During the robbery, |the assailant wore 
two nylons over his head, wielded a sawed-cj>ff shotgun, and spun 
Ms. Horn around and dragged her through the Payless store at 
gunpoint (T. 51-55). It was when she was fumbling with the cash 
register and monitoring two customers and a fellow employee in 
the store that he threatened to blow her in half with the sawed-
off shotgun and she looked at her assailant's nylon-masked face 
(T. 52-55): 
Q Did you ever get a look at thib individual's face? 
A Yes, I did, a good look. 
Q When? I 
A When he was pointing the jgun at me 
telling me if I set off the alarm and he was 
going to blow me in half I was looking right 
at his face the whole time. 
Q That was through the nylon stockings? 
A Yes. I 
o£ the record relating 
(T. 55)(emphasis added). 
In addition to the misstatement 
to the amount of time Ms. Horn spent looking at the assailant's 
face, the Court of Appeals failed to explain its assumption that 
Ms. Horn's independent recollection stemmed from the robbery, 
rather than from the lineup, which Ms. Horn attended prior to 
7 
trial.10 Mr. Drawn was neither wearing two nylons on his head 
nor wielding a sawed-off shotgun at the lineup (nor was the 
person Ms. Horn identified at the line-up or any other 
participant).11 While Ms. Horn explained that she had her child 
with her and was not wearing her glasses at the line-up (T. 56, 
67), perhaps her being spun around and dragged through the 
Payless store at gunpoint by someone wearing two nylons on the 
head, and her fumbling with the cash register and monitoring two 
customers and a fellow employee in the store as her assailant 
threatened to blow her in half (T. 52-55) were as distracting to 
her as were the presence of her child and the absence of her 
glasses at the line-up.12 
REASONS WHY QUESTIONS PRESENTED JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
This Court should grant certiorari on question 1 
relating to the violation of Mr. Drawn1s rights to confrontation, 
because the Court of Appeals failed to address necessary facts in 
the record and diverged from controlling case law in disposing of 
the issue. 
The trial court's instructing the jurors that they 
could accept Officer Edwards' recitation of the statements of 
10 Ms. Horn could not remember if Mr. Drawn was in the 
lineup (T. 61). 
11 Defense Exhibit 2. 
12 There is apparently nothing in the record to indicate 
that she was wearing her glasses during the robbery or at trial, 
when she identified Mr. Drawn as the perpetrator. Indeed, if Ms. 
Horn was wearing her glasses at trial, it is curious that she had 
to explain to the jurors, "I wear glasses and I didn't have my 
glasses on [at the lineup]."" (TT 67) (emphasis added). 
8 
Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus "as if thiy were testifying" 
was without legal foundation and an improper comment on the 
evidence•13 
The trial court also erred in raising and sustaining a 
hearsay objection when defense counsel was trying to establish 
that Officer Edwards had called a defense witness, 
misrepresenting that he was calling on behalf of defense 
counsel.14 
Although the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue, 
these errors also violated Mr. Drawn's rigljit to confrontation. 
See Kentucky v. Stincer, 428 U.S. 730, 737 (1987)(defining "two 
broad, albeit not exclusive" categories of cases in which the 
Confrontation Clause is violated: "cases involving the admission 
of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions 
imposed by law or by the trial court on thp scope of cross-
examination. ")(emphasis added).15 
13 There is no rule of evidence or (law indicating that 
the unavailability of hearsay declarants makes a witness quoting 
a hearsay declarant accurate or reliable. Cf. State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989)(custodial statements may violate 
due process if recorded improperly). 
See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 and State v. 
Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1972)(judicial comment on 
evidence is forbidden). 
14 See Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) ("'Hearsay1 is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.")(emphasis added)L 
15 The trial court's bolstering of Officer Edwards placed 
the imprimatur of the trial court on that witness, exacerbating 
the violation of Mr. Drawn's confrontation of the absent 
witnesses quoted by Officer Edwards. 
While the trial court's hearsay objection and ruling 
9 
Inasmuch as Officer Edwards' testimony was the one of 
the bases of the trial court's and Court of Appeals' ruling that 
Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were unavailable, and provided 
the content of the statements characterized by the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals as "statements against interest", 
Officer Edwards' testimony was key to the violation of Mr. 
Drawn1s rights to confrontation, and should have been fully 
addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion diverges from that of 
the United States Supreme Court on whether the statements of 
accomplices are considered "statements against penal interest" 
for purposes of confrontation clause analysis. In discussing 
the admissibility of the custodial statements of Rosemary Mar and 
Genora Marcellus, the Court of Appeals relied explicitly on Lee 
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). Drawn at 894. In the Lee 
opinion, however, the Court explicitly rejected the reasoning of 
the trial court and Court of Appeals: "We reject respondent's 
categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple 
'declaration against penal interest.' That concept defines too 
large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." Lee 
at 544 n. 5. 
The Court of Appeals' decision applies the wrong 
cut off direct examination of the witness discussing the 
telephone call from Officer Edwards, the effect of the ruling was 
to prohibit Mr. Drawn from impeaching Officer Edwards, and falls 
within the rationale of the Stincer opinion. See Stincer at 738-
739 (discussing how the Confrontation Clause prohibits the 
prohibition of questioning eliciting facts bearing on credibility 
of witnesses). 
10 
Ms. Mar and Ms. 
foundational inquiry in characterizing the Statements of Rosemary 
Mar and Genora Marcellus as "against penal Interest." The Court 
of Appeals explained that the statements of 
Marcellus were made against their penal interest because the 
women could have been prosecuted as accomplices to the robbery 
i 
under Utah Code Ann- section 76-2-202 (1978). Drawn, at 894. 
The Court of Appeals failed to make the relevant foundational 
inquiry about the declarants' exculpatory ijrtent in making the 
statements. See Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) ("A statement 
which at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended 
to subject him to civil or criminal liability, .. . that a. 
reasonable man in his position would not haye made the statement 
unless he believed it to be true.); State v 
270, 273 (Utah 1972)(prospect of damage to hearsay declarant 
substitutes for the reliability showing traditionally made 
. Sanders, 496 P.2d 
in Appendix 3. 
the admission of the 
through cross-examination). See statements) 
As an alternate mode of affirming) 
hearsay statements, the Court of Appeals found the statements 
reliable, by referring to corroborative facts that were wholly 
unrelated to the making of the hearsay statements,16 despite the 
16 The Court stated: 
When the statements were made, Mar and 
Marcellus were under arrest and suspects in 
the Payless robbery. Their statements were 
substantially similar. Furthermore, other 
witnesses observed a white station wagon 
Teaving the crime scene, a black man exiting 
the vehicle before it was pulled over by 
police, and the police discovered money and 
11 
fact that the hearsay statements must be evaluated in light of 
the circumstances in which they were made. Compare Drawn at 894 
(relying on evidence corroborating but unrelated to the making of 
the hearsay statements) with Lee v, Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544-
545 (1986)(reliability must be found in circumstances 
surrounding the making of the hearsay statements); State v. 
Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355-1356 n.3 (Utah 1986)(same); State v. 
Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984)(same).17 
the shotgun near the arrest scene. [Both 
Marcellus and Mar also told Edwards that they 
were waiting in the car when defendant came 
running back and said that he had "just 
robbed a store *" The two then stated that 
defendant got into the car, Marcellus drove 
away, and defendant was let out of the car 
before the police detained and arrested the 
two women. Furthermore, both women admitted 
disposing of the money and shotgun before 
being arrested*] The declarations implicated 
defendant, but also subjected the two women 
to prosecution as accomplices. See Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-2-202 (1978)(any person who 
aids another in commission of a crime is 
criminally liable as a party). The witnesses 
also aided defendant's escape and disposed of 
incriminating evidence. The State could have 
prosecuted the two women for the robbery. 
The statements of the women were made against 
penal interest and there was no error in 
admitting them through the testimony of 
Detective Edwards. 
Drawn at 894 (emphasis added; bracketed portion appears in 
footnote 5 of the Court's opinion). 
17 Proper analysis of the circumstances surrounding the 
hearsay statements in the instant case counsels against a 
finding of reliability. Officer Edwards testified that after 
being briefed on the case by Officers Newbold and Halverson, he 
read Rosemary and Genora their Miranda rights, and interviewed 
them without recording the statements (he claimed the tape 
recorder was not used at their request) (T.2 148-154). Compare 
Lee at 544 ("The unsworn statement was given in response to the 
questions of police, who, having already interrogated Lee, no 
12 
This Court should grant certiorari on question 2 
because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of 
appellate review and misconstrued the record in finding the in-
court identification proper. 
Because the trial court neither h^d nor sought the 
evidence necessary to make a proper ruling 
the in-court identification at the time the| 
Court of Appeals was incorrect in applying 
of discretion" standard of review, which contemplates that the 
trial courts are attentively presiding over} 
them. See Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 
|on the admission of 
court ruled,18 the 
the deferential "abuse 
the cases before 
702 (Utah 
1974)(explaining the rationale behind the 4 b u s e of discretion 
standard of appellate review). 
doubt knew what they were looking for, and the statement was not 
tested in any manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by 
counsel, or its equivalent."). Further, tne two statements 
diverged on the critical issue of responsibility for the crime, 
"(1) witness foreknowledge of the robbery; (2) participation in 
'casing' the store; and (3) which participant wanted the robbery 
committed. A fourth possible area, also insignificant, is where 
the car was parked prior to the robbery." Appellee's brief, page 
25 n. 9. Compare Lee at 545 ("As we have 
recognized, a codefendant's confession is 
unreliable as to the passages detailing th^ 
or culpability because those passages may 
the codefendant's desire to shift or spread 
favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another. If those 
portions of the codefendant's purportedly 'interlocking' 
statement which bear to any significant degree on the defendant's 
participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by 
the defendant's own confession, the admission of those statements 
poses too serious a threat to the accuracy| 
countenanced by the Sixth Amendment."). 
consistently 
>resumptively 
defendant's conduct 
/ell be the product of 
the blame, curry 
of the verdict to be 
18 Compare the trial court's ruling!, "If she has any 
independent recollection she can testify to it." (T. 57) to State 
v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989)(explaining detailed 
foundational inquiry preceding in-court identification). 
13 
The Court of Appeals misconstrued the record in failing 
to recognize all of the factors relating to the suggestiveness of 
the in-court identification (shackles, race), in exaggerating Ms. 
Horn's opportunity to view her assailant's face by misquoting the 
record out of context ("the whole time" during the robbery)# and 
in failing to account for the impact of the line-up between the 
robbery and the in-court identification on the in-court 
identification. Misconstruction of the record is a proper basis 
to issue the writ of certiorari. See State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah 
Adv. Rep 13, 14-15 (Utah 1990)(correcting Court of Appeals' 
misconstruction of the record). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Drawn requests that this Court grant a writ of 
certiorari on questions 1 and 2. 
Respectfully submitted this , 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that 11) copies 
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DELIVERED by 
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APPENDIX 1 
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
8 9 0 Utah 791 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
tarily consented to the search of the trunk 
or the suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall 
abandoned any privacy interest in the suit-
cases and thus lacks standing to challenge 
their search, and finally, if the trial court 
finds there was an illegal search of the 
trunk or suitcases, whether there is a suffi-
cient nexus between that illegal search and 
Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases. 
DAVIDSON ami JACKSON I.I, 
concur. 
I O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Johnny Wade DRAWN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 890253-CA. 
Appeals 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S. 
Young, of aggravated robbery. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davidson, 
J., held that (1) trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting witness9 in-court 
identification testimony; (2) hearsay state-
ments were properly admitted under un-
available witness exception; and (3) defen-
dant's sentence was permissibly enhanced 
for use of firearm. 
Affirmed. 
L Criminal Law <&=>339.9(3) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting salesperson's in-court identifi-
cation of shoe store robbery defendant, 
have been suggestive, there was adequate 
independent basis for identification. 
2, Criminal Law <s=»1169.5(2) 
Any error attributed to alleged mis-" 
identification of defendant by witness at 
trial was cured by detailed jury instruction 
which properly apprised jury of inherent 
limitations of eyewitness identification, 
3. Criminal Law <S=>419(1, 5) 
Hearsay statements of witness are ad-
missible at trial provided that State can 
show witness' unavailability and prove that 
statement bears adequate indicia of reliabO-
ity U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; Const Art 
i § 12; Rules of Evid Rule 804(a)(5). 
I Criminal Law <3=>419(5) 
State showed unavailability of witness-
es, as required for witnesses' statements to 
be admissible under unavailable witness ex-
ception to hearsay rule; State subpoenaed 
each witness several times, attempted to 
make personal contact, and used infor-
mants and other police resources to locate 
them, all of which proved unsuccessful 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; Const Art 1, 
§ 12; Rules of Evid., Rule 804(aX5). 
5. Criminal Law s=>419(5) 
Statements of unavailable witnesses 
had sufficient indicia of reliability to war-
rant admission under unavailable witness 
exception to hearsay rule; statements of 
witnesses were made against their penal 
interests, their statements were substan-
tially similar, and other evidence corrobo-
rated portions of statements. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6; Rules of Evid., Rules 
804fa)(5), 804(b)(3). 
6. Criminal Law ^1208.6(4) 
Aggravated robbery defendant's sen-
tence was permissibly enhanced for use of 
firearm. 
Fames A. Valdez, Elizabeth Holbrook (ar-
gued), Salt Lake Legal Defender Asso., 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant 
Cite as 791 P.2d 890 (UtahApp. 1990) 
Before DAVIDSON, BILLINGS and 
ORME, JJ. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of ag-
gravated robbery. He argues that the trial 
court erred by failing to suppress a wit-
ness's in-court identification of defendant, 
by admitting hearsay statements of un-
available witnesses, and by enhancing his 
sentence for the use of a firearm. We 
affirm. 
On August 21, 1988, a man entered the 
Payless Shoe Store located in Magna, Utah, 
wearing pink- and beige-colored nylon 
stockings over his head and carrying a 
sawed-off shotgun. Two salespersons 
were working at the time. The man or-
dered one salesperson to hand over all the 
money in the register and the other sales-
person to take all the money out of the safe 
and place it in a corduroy bag. The sales-
person working at the register testified 
that she was looking at the man's face "the 
whole time." The second salesperson only 
viewed the man briefly. 
F After the robbery, a woman driving 
through the mall parking lot observed a 
man wearing something pink on his head, 
running alongside the Payless Shoe Store 
attempting to shove something into a bag. 
The witness observed the man enter a 
small white station wagon driven by a 
black woman and watched the car exit the 
parking lot heading southbound on 5600 
yest and later turning west on 3500 South. 
She reported this information to the police 
Sfter discovering that the shoe store had 
Ken robbed. She later identified the car 
T the police had detained the car and its 
pants. 
Several blocks from the robbery, a 
urth witness observed a light-skinned 
man exit a white compact station 
gon. Several minutes later, he observed 
lice officer pull the station wagon over 
id handcuff the vehicle's two remaining 
|male occupants. After observing this, he 
ive down the road where he observed the 
ie black man. The witness lost sight of 
16. man for ahnnt fiftepn or twentv min-
wearing different clothing. The witness 
thereafter lost sight of the black man. 
West Valley City Police Officer Kory 
Newbold responded to the Payless robbery. 
While driving to Payless he observed a 
possible suspect vehicle travelling in the 
opposite direction. The officer turned 
around, and pursued the vehicle. He mo-
mentarily lost sight of the vehicle but later 
found it on a side street and pulled it over. 
He questioned the two black female occu-
pants, but released them because they did 
not match the reported description. Upon 
returning to the patrol car, the officer re-
ceived updated information on the suspects 
and getaway vehicle. With this knowl-
edge, he again pulled the vehicle over and 
this time arrested the occupants. 
At the arrest scene, one witness identi-
fied the car as the getaway vehicle, another 
recognized one of the women suspects as 
having been in the shoe store earlier in the 
day. The bag of money and the shotgun 
used in the robbery were also found near 
the scene of arrest At the police station, 
the two suspects were interviewed by De-
tective Ron Edwards of the West Valley 
City Police Department Detective Ed-
wards later testified that both women ad-
mitted that they waited in the car while 
defendant robbed the shoe store. Edwards 
also testified that both women told him 
that after the robbery, they momentarily 
evaded police, let defendant out, and threw 
the money bag and gun out the window. 
Neither woman testified at trial. Instead, 
their testimony was admitted through De-
tective Edwards under the unavailability 
exception to the hearsay rule. See Utah 
R.Evid. 804. 
Defendant was arrested the day after 
the robbery and was questioned by Detec-
tive Edwards. Detective Edwards later 
testified that defendant confessed to the 
robbery after asking defendant's parole of-
ficer and another police officer to leave the 
interrogation room. Neither the testimony 
of the two women nor defendant's testimo-
ny was recorded. 
Two lineups were held several weeks af-
ter the robberv. None of the witnesses 
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dant as the perpetrator of the 
trial, however, one of the Payless employ-
ees identified defendant as the robber. 
Over defendant's objections, her in-court 
identification was allowed. 
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
[1] Defendant first argues that the 
court erred in not suppressing the wit-
ness's in-court identification. He contends 
that the identification, made while defen-
dant was sitting at counsel table, was im-
permissibly suggestive and denied him a 
fair trial. Although the witness previously 
failed to identify defendant at a lineup, at 
trial she claimed to have independent recol-
lection of defendant as the perpetrator of 
the crime: 
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he 
turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And that was 
i t And everything about him—the fea-
tures—I just . . . it was him. I just 
couldn't—I don't know. But I recog-
nized him. The way he moved, the way 
his back was over, the wrinkles on the 
^forehead, his nose, everything. 
The suggestiveness of the witness's in-
court identification is reviewed under the 
totality of the circumstances. Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,113, 97 S.Ct 2243, 
2252, 53 LEd.2d 140 (1977); Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 188,199, 93 S.Ct 375, 382, 34 
L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); State v. Thamer, 777 
P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989); State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1980). 
We apply a two-part test to determine if 
identification procedures are impermissibly 
suggestive: 
[W]as [the identification procedure] so 
impermissively suggestive as to give rise 
to a very substantial likelihood of irrepa-
rable misidentification [I]f the 
[identification procedure was] impermis-
sibly suggestive, then the in-court identi-
fication must be based on an untainted, 
independent foundation to be reliable. 
± numcT, 111 L.2A at 435. Here, the i^n-
court identification was suggestive and car. 
ried a likelihood of misidentification. See 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-88 (Utah 
1986). We therefore apply the second 
prong of the Thamer test to determine if 
the identification was "based on an untaint 
ed, independent foundation." Thamer, Til 
P.2d at 435. We will not reverse a trial 
court's evidentiary rulings absent a show-
ing that the lower court abused its discre-
tion. See, e.g., State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 
1140, 1142 (Utah CtApp.1989). . " 
In considering the likelihood of misidenti-
fication, we review the following factors: 
the opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witnesses] degree of attention, the accu 
racy of the witnesses] prior descriptor 
of the criminal, the level of certaintj 
demonstrated by the witness at the con 
frontation, and the length of time be 
tween the crime and the confrontation 
Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (quoting Neil, 40) 
U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct at 382). 
[2] The salesperson's in-court identifier 
tion focused not on defendant's face, bu 
rather on his features, movements, an 
forehead wrinkles. In her statement 1 
police, made on the day of the robbery, sh 
stated that the robber "wasn't white," ths 
his "hair and skin was [sic] a little dark 
and the suspect was possibly hispanic < 
Mexican. Defendant is in fact a ligl 
skinned black man. The witness was al 
looking at his face "the whole time" durii 
the robbery. There is no serious inconsi 
ency between the prior description and t1 
subsequent in-court identification to ma 
the identification unreliable.1 
While defendant's presence at coum 
table may have been suggestive, we cam 
say that under the totality of circumsta 
es there was "a very substantial likelihc 
of irreparable misidentification," since 
adequate independent basis for the ident 
cation exists. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116, 
S.Ct at 2254 (quoting Simmons v. Uni 
OSGUTHORPE v. 
Cite as 791 P^d 895 
lot be applied where an element of the 
underlying crime is the use of a firearm. 
Both this court and the Utah Supreme 
3ourt have recently ruled that imposition 
>f the firearms enhancement penally in 
aggravated robbery cases is permissible 
and comports with the legislature's intent 
in imposing an additional penalty when a 
firearm is used in the commission of a 
felony. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 
191 (Utah 1990); State-v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 85-87 (Ct.App.1990). 
The legislature has clearly expressed its 
intention to more severely punish all felons 
who use a firearm. Russell, 791 P.2d at 
191. Defendant's sentence has not been 
doubly enhanced in a manner inconsistent 
with the legislature's intent nor is that 
intent ambiguous to any extent Rather, 
he was convicted of aggravated robbery 
but was given an enhanced sentence be-
cause a firearm was used to ™™*™* ^ e 
crime. 
We find no error in the trial court's rul-
ings and accordingly affirm defendant's 
conviction and sentence. 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
OSGUTHORPE Utah 895 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
attorney fees and costs by the Court of 
Appeals, — P.2d — . The Court of Ap-
peals held that ex-wife was entitled to costs 
and reasonable attorney fees incurred on 
appeal. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=>224 
Before court will award attorney fees 
in domestic proceeding, trial court must 
find requesting party is in need of financial 
assistance and that fees requested are rea-
sonable. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
2. Divorce <s=>194, 226 
Evidence supported trial court's find-
ings that ex-wife did not have ability to pay 
her attorney fees incurred at trial and that 
ex-husband should pay a portion of her 
fees; accordingly, ex-wife was also entitled 
to costs and reasonable attorney fees in-
curred on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
David S. Dolowitz and M. Joy Douglas, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant 
Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
DAVISON, JJ.. 
Jeanette OSGUTHORPE, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry OSGUTHORPE, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 890219-CA, 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 10, 1990. 
Domestic proceeding was brought 
The Salt Lake County District Court, Ho-
mor F Wilkinson. J., awarded ex-wife ali-
ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court pursuant 
to plaintiffs petition for rehearing. Plain-
tiff claims she is entitled to attorney fees 
and costs on appeal. 
[1] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) 
-provides that this court may order either 
party to pay attorney fees incurred, includ-
ing attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah 
CtApp.1989). Before a court will award 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
F I L E D 
JUN2 61990 
C > ^ ^f Jh# Court 
Uten C# jrx «t Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Johnny Wade Drawn, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890253-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed May 14, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
ORME, J., dissents in part by separate opinion. 
I concur in the decision to deny rehearing of the 
issues raised in points II and III of appellant's 
petition for rehearing. I dissent from the decision to 
deny rehearing of the issues raised in point I, as to 
which I would call for a response from appellee and 
defer ruling pending consideratipn of that response. 
day of June, 1990. Dated this °_ 
BY THE COURT 
Orme, Judge 
APPENDIX 2 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
uuah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, 
for a term at not less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or 
a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used 
in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently... 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 (1978) 
(1) a person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
deemed to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if 
it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flijght after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2 
. . . . I 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or Jin aid of its 
jurisdiction. 
• • • . 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication.... 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII section 3 
I 
The supreme court shall have original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. The supreme court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue 
all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the 
supreme court's jurisdiction or the complete 
determination of any cause* 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right# but of judicial discretion/ and will be granted 
only for special and important reasons. The following/ 
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion/ indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a 
decision of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of municipal/ 
state# or federal law which has not been# but 
should be# settled by the Supreme Court* 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 
The court shall not comment on the evidence in the 
case, and if the court states any of the evidence, it 
must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) 
'Hearsay' is a statement/ other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing/ 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) defines statements against 
interest/ and excepts them from the proscription of the hearsay 
rule: 
A statement which at the time of its making so far 
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest/ or so far tended to subject him to civil or 
criminal liability/ .•. that a reasonable man in his 
position would not have made the statement unless he 
believed it to be true. 
APPENDIX 3 
OFFICER EDWARDS' TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS OF MR. DRAWN, MS. MAR, 
AND MS. MARCELLUE 
' I OBVIOUSLY THE TESTIMONY THAT HE IS REFERRING 
2 } TO AS TO THAT WHICH SHE SAID IS HEARSAY. PRIOR TO THIS 
3 I HEARING THE COURT HAS RULED, HOWEVER, THE UNAVAILABILITY 
4 OF THOSE WITNESSES —THERE WAS APPROPRIATE EFFORT, THE COURT 
5 HAS FOUND, BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO LOCATE THOSE 
[THAT THE OFFICER MAY TESTIFY 
WITNESS SAID TO HIM. 
6 WITNESSES WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE 
7 TO THAT TESTIMONY AS TO WHAT THAT 
8 AND YOU MAY EXCEPT THAT AS THOUGH) THAT WITNESS WERE 
9 TESTIFYING. 
10 Q (BY MR. VERHOEF) AGAIN, I WILL REPEAT MY QUES-
11 TION. DETECTIVE EDWARDS, WILL YOU PLEASE RECOUNT TO THE 
I 
12 JURY, USING THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS BY YOU AND BY ROSEMARY 
13 MAR INDICATING WHO THE SPEAKER I$| AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES 
14 AND WHAT WAS SAID BY WHOM? 
15 A YES, SIR. APPROXIMATELY 6:10 P.M. ON THE NIGHT 
16 OF THE 21ST, WHICH WAS SUNDAY EVENING, I THEN PROCEEDED 
17 TO INTERVIEW WITH MS. MAR. MS. MAR, I ASKED HER, IF SHE'D 
18 SPEAK TO US. SHE SAID YES, SHE WOULD. AND AT THAT TIME 
19 I ASKED HER TO START FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY WHEN 
20 SHE FIRST HAD THE VEHICLE. I HAjD ALREADY RUN A 28 AS A 
21 REGISTRATION CHECK ON THE VEHICLE, LICENSE PLATE NUMBER, 
2 2
 AND FOUND THAT IT CAME BACK TO AN AUDRY ROBBINS. ROBINSON. 
23 I THEN ASKED HER ABOUJ THE CAR. SHE SAID IT 
24 BELONGS TO AUDRY ROBBINS. I TH$N ASKED HER, I SAID, WON'T 
25 YOU START FROM THE TIME YOU PICKED THE CAR UP. SHE STATED 
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1 AT APPROXIMATELY 3:00 O'CLOCK THAT AFTERNOON THERE WAS HER 
2 AND MS. MARCELLUS AND A MR. JOHNNY DRAWN THAT WAS IN THE 
3 VEHICLE. I ASKED HER WHAT HAPPENED. THEN SHE STATED THEY 
4 STARTED GOING WEST, THEY WENT DOWN ON 3500 SOUTH, WENT WEST 
5 ON 3500 SOUTH. MS. AUDREY, THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE 
6 VEHICLE, LIVES AT 1601 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD. 
7 MR. VALDEZ: I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THAT AND 
8 ASK THAT BE STRICKEN. IT'S HEARSAY THAT AUDREY OWNS THAT 
9 VEHICLE. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T THINK—THE OBJECTION WILL 
11 BE SUSTAINED. THAT FACT IS NOT A CRITICAL FACT TO THIS 
12 CASE SO PLEASE IGNORE ANY REFERENCE TO THE REGISTERED OWNER 
13 OF THE VEHICLE. 
14 THE WITNESS: SHE STATED THAT HER, MARCELLUS 
15 AND MR. DRAWN WAS GOING WEST ON 3500 SOUTH. SHE STATED 
16 THEY PULLED INTO THE PAYLESS SHOE APPROXIMATELY 56 WEST, 
17 3500 SOUTH. SHE STATED THAT HER AND MARCELLUS PROCEEDED 
IS TO BUY SOME SHOES. THAT THEY WENT INTO THE STORE, LOOKED 
19 AROUND, COULDN'T FIND ANYTHING THAT MARCELLUS NEEDED. THEY 
20 WENT BACK OUT AND GOT INTO THE VEHICLE AT WHICH TIME JOHNNY 
21 SAID, I'LL BE RIGHT BACK. HE WENT INTO THE STORE, ROSEMARY 
22 STATED, A FEW MINUTES LATER HE COME RUNNING BACK, JUMPED 
23 IN THE CAR AND SAID, LET'S GET OUT OF HERE. 
24 THEY TOOK OFF. SHE SAID WHAT HAPPENED, HE SAID, 
25 i JUST ROBBED A STORE. AT WHICH TIME ROSEMARY SAYS THAT 
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THE POLICE WERE FOLLOWING HER. SHE KEPT YELLING FOR JOHNNY 
TO GET OUT OF THE CAR, GET OUT OF THE CAR. JOHNNY THEN 
GOT OUT OF "THE VEHICLE. SHE STATED THAT AT THAT TIME SHE 
GRABBED A SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN AND TH^ MONEY AND THE DENIM 
BAG AND THREW IT OUT THE DOOR. I f\SKED HER WHO WAS JOHNNY. 
SHE STATED AGAIN THAT IT WAS JOHNNp" DRAWN, HER BOYFRIEND. 
I ASKED HER TO GIVE ME A PHYSICAL pESCRIPTION OF HIM, WHICH 
SHE DID—FIVE FOOT NINE, 150 POUNDS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES 
AND WHAT HE WAS WEARING WAS THAT HE HAD A GOLD WATCH ON 
HIS LEFT HAND, NO OTHER JEWELRY TH|AT SHE KNEW OF. THEN 
WE TALKED FOR A FEW MORE MINUTES 
GOING TO BE BOOKED IN JAIL. I STATED, YES, SHE WAS 
THAT'S JUST ABOUT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION 
WITH ROSEMARY. 
Q CBY MR. VERHOEF) DID vfou HAVE ANY FURTHER CONVER-
SATION WITH ROSEMARY THEREAFTER? 
A ONE OTHER TIME. 
RELATING TO THIS CASE? 
YES. 
SHE ASKED ME IF SHE WAS 
Q-
A 
Q 
A 
ION TAKE PLACE? WHEN DID THAT CONVERSA1 
SHE CALLED UP AND WANTED TO KNOW WHEN SHE COULD 
GET HER DRIVER'S LICENSE, HER I.D , AND HER PURSE. 
Q WHEN WAS THAT CALL? 
A APPROXIMATELY A WEEK AFTER THE INCIDENT. 
Q WERE THOSE ITEMS RETURNED TO HER? 
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1 A YES, THEY WERE. 
2 Q DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH THE OTHER 
3 OCCUPANT OF THE VEHICLE? 
4 A I DID. 
5 Q WHAT WAS HER NAME? 
6 A GENOVIA MARCELLUS. I THINK IT'S SPELLED 
7 G_E-N-0-V-I-A. 
8 I BROUGHT HER INTO THE INTERVIEW ROOM. I INFORMEDJ 
9 HER OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT PER MIRANDA. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED 
10 THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD 'EM. 
11 Q THIS IS ALSO ON 8/21 OF 1988? 
12 A YES, IT WAS, SIR. 
13 Q THIS IS RIGHT AFTER WE HAD COMPLETED THE INTER-
14 VIEW WITH ROSEMARY? 
15 A YES. THE TIME WAS APPROXIMATELY 6:*f0. GIVE 
16 OR TAKE A FEW MINUTES. 
17 Q AGAIN, WAS A TAPE RECORDER AVAILABLE IN THE ROOM 
18 FOR USE? 
19 A YES, IT WAS. 
20 Q WAS IT USED? 
21 A NO, IT WAS NOT. 
22 Q WHY WAS IT NOT USED? 
23 A SHE DIDN'T WANT IT TAPED EITHER. 
24 Q OKAY. WOULD YOU PLEASE RECOUNT TO THE JURY, 
2 5
 THE SAME AS YOU DID THE LAST TIME, WHAT WAS SAID BY WHOM 
153 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
HER THE SAME THING, TO 
ER IN THE DAY. SHE STATED 
ABOUT THE SAME STORY-
USING THE QUESTION AND ANSWER FOR^ M IF YOU POSSIBLY CAN? 
A AFTER SHE WAS GIVEN H6R RIGHTS PER MIRANDA SHE 
STATED, YEAH, SHE WOULD TALK TO l|s, THAT SHE DIDN'T KNOW 
WHAT WAS GOING ON. I THEN ASKED 
START BACK TO WHAT HAPPENED EARL I 
THAT A BOY NAMED JOHNNY WAS IN THjE CAR. HER AND ROSEMARY 
AND THIS—AND ROSEMARY'S BOYFRIENb, JOHNNY, WAS IN THE CAR. 
LATER SHE SAID IT WAS JOHNNY DRAWN. 
AT WHICH TIME SHE GOES 
THEY WERE GOING WEST ON 3500 SOUTH, THEY REACHED THE 
7-ELEVEN AT 5600 WEST AND 3500 SOUTH. MARCELLUS STATED 
THAT AT THAT TIME SHE PULLED INTO 
SHE WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE. JOHNNY LEFT THE VEHICLE, WENT 
ACROSS THE STREET TO THE PAYLESS SHOES. SHE SAID THEN 
JOHNNY COME RUNNING BACK, SAID, LET'S GO, AND AT THAT TIME 
JOHNNY INFORMED HER THAT HE ROBBED A PAYLESS SHOE. THEN 
SHE GOES ABOUT THE COPS STOPPING HER AND BRINGING HER DOWN. 
THAT WAS ALL SHE WOULD TALK ABOUT J 
Q ANY FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH GENOVEA? 
NO. 
ANYTHING THEREAFTER? 
NONE. 
AND YOU'VE MADE ATTEMp l b 10 LUUAlt bU IH Ul- iflUbt 
THE 7-ELEVEN, MEANING 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
WOMEN? 
A I HAVE. 
m 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. YOU'LL RESERVE YOUR 
2 RIGHT TO RAISE THAT LEGAL ARGUMENT? 
3 MR. VALDEZ: THANK YOU, YES. 
4 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
5 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) 
7 BY MR. VERHOEF: 
8 Q DETECTIVE EDWARDS, DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO TALK 
9 TO THE DEFENDANT, JOHNNY DRAWN? 
10 A I DID. 
11 Q WHEN DID YOU DO THAT? 
12 A THE 22ND OF AUGUST OF '88. 
13 Q WHERE DID THAT OCCUR? 
14 A AT WEST VALLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
15 Q WERE THERE OTHER PEACE OFFICERS PRESENT? 
16 A THERE WAS. 
17 Q WHO? 
18 A THERE WAS OFFICER CARVER AND OFFICER SULLIVAN. 
19 Q DID MR. DRAWN TALK TO YOU ABOUT THIS EVENT? 
20 A YES. 
21 Q WAS YOUR TAPE RECORDER PRESENT? 
22 A YES. 
23 Q WAS IT USED? 
24 A NO. 
25 Q WHY WAS IT NOT USE? 
157 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
CARVER AND MR. SULLIVAN 
US WITH THE TAPE RECORDER 
A MR. DRAWN, IN WITH MR. 
PRESENT, DID NOT WANT TO SPEAK TO 
ON. 
Q DID THERE COME A TIME VfHEN MR. SULLIVAN AND MR. 
CARVER WERE NOT PRESENT? 
A YES. 
Q AT WHOSE REQUEST WAS T^IAT? 
A BY MR. DRAWN. 
Q PERHAPS I SHOULD BACKTRACK. WHAT WAS SAID BY 
MR. DRAWN PRIOR TO MR. CARVER AND|'MR. SULLIVAN LEAVING THE 
ROOM CONCERNING THIS CASE? 
A THE OTHER OFFICERS HAD 
IN THE EVENING AND BROUGHT HIM TO 
AT WHICH TIME I WAS CALLED AT MY 
PICKED UP MR. DRAWN EARLIER 
WEST VALLEY P.O. AND 
HOME WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 
8:00 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT. I THEN RESPONDED TO THE WEST VALLEY 
N. 
MR. DRAWN AND THE TWO OTHER 
P.D. WHERE I INTERVIEWED MR. DRAW) 
AS I ENTERED THE ROOM 
OFFICERS WERE THERE. AND MR. DRAWN STATED HIS INNOCENCE 
AT THAT TIME BUT THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT HE WAS TALKING 
ABOUT. HE STATED THAT HE HAD TAllKED TO ROSEMARY FROM THE 
JAIL AND THAT ROSEMARY TOLD HIM JHAT SOME BLACK GUY WAS 
RUNNING BY THE PAYLESS'SHOES, WAVED 'EM DOWN AND ASKED TO 
JUMP—TO GET IN THE CAR, TO DRIVf THEM AWAY, THAT SOME WHITE 
BOYS WERE CHASING HIM. AT WHICH 
DRAWN I DIDN'T BELIEVE HIS STORY 
TIME I EXPLAINED TO MR. 
AND AT WHICH TIME I ASKED 
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1 IF HE HAD ALREADY HAD HIS RIGHTS PER MIRANDA GIVEN TO HIM 
2 AT WHICH TIME HE ASKED IF HE COULD SPEAK TO ME ALONE AND 
3 HAVE THE TWO OTHER OFFICERS LEAVE THE ROOM. 
4 Q WHAT WAS SAID BY WHOM? AND IF YOU CAN DO IT 
5 BY QUESTION AND ANSWER, BRIEFLY, BETWEEN YOU AND MR. 'DRAWN 
6 WITHOUT ANYONE ELSE PRESENT. 
7 A APPROXIMATELY TWO TO THREE MINUTES HAD EXPIRED 
8 FROM THE TIME HIS RIGHTS WERE READ TO HIM. AFTER THE TWO 
9 OTHER OFFICERS LEFT THE ROOM I ASKED HIM POINT BLANK, DID 
10 YOU DO THE ROBBERY? HE SAID, WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME? I SAID, 
1! I CAN'T GIVE YOU ANY PROMISES. EVERYTHING'S GOING TO HAVE 
12 TO GO THROUGH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. HE STATED, 
13 I DON'T WANT ROSEMARY CHARGED. I SAYS, I STILL CANNOT GIVE 
14 YOU A GUARANTEE. I SAID, THAT'S UP TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
15 OFFICE ABOUT THAT. HE STATED, YES, I DID IT. I SAID, WILL 
16 YOU EXPLAIN TO ME HOW YOU DID IT. HE SAYS THAT THEY WERE 
17 AT HIS SISTER'S PLACE, AUDREY'S ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON. THEY 
18 LEFT THE HOUSE IN HER.CAR. THEY WERE GOING WEST. THAT 
t9 ROSEMARY WANTED HIM TO DO THE ROBBERY. -IT WAS HIS GIRL-
20 FRIEND. THAT THEY WENT OUT TO THE PAYLESS SHOE ON 5600 
21 WEST 3500 SOUTH. HE HAD THE TWO GIRLS GO IN TO LOOK AT 
22 THE BUILDING, THE PAYLESS SHOES, HOW MANY GIRLS WERE THERE, 
23 WHERE THE.SAFE WAS AND THE DIAGRAM OF THE PLACE, MORE OR 
24 I LESS, AT WHICH TIME THEY CAME OUT, THEN HE WENT IN AND 
ROBBED THEM. 25 
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HE STATED HE HAD A SHOTGUN, THAT HE PUT THE MA^ 
OVER HIS HEAD. HE WENT IN THERE WITH THE SHOTGUN. HE 
STATED AT THAT TIME THAT IT WASN'T LOADED, THAT HE DIDN'T 
WANT TO HURT ANYBODY. HE SAID HE WENT IN THERE, HAD FORCED 
ONE WOMAN DOWN, HE TOOK THE OTHER WOMAN BACK TO THE SAFE 
AND TO THE TILL, PUT THE MONEY IN A DENIM BAG AND RAN OUT. 
HE SAID HE GOT IN THE CAR; THEY TOOK OFF. AS 
HE WENT DOWN ONE OF THE STREETS THEY SAID A WEST VALLEY 
OFFICER TURNED AROUND ON 'EM; THEY TRIED TO EVADE HIM. 
HE JUMPED OUT AT THAT TIME. 
HE SAYS THAT ROSEMARY THREW THE GUN AND THE MONEY 
OUT OF THE CAR. HE WENT INTO THE BUSHES IN A FIELD, DID 
A SEMI CIRCLE AND WATCHED THE OFFICERS THERE FROM ACROSS 
THE STREET IN THE WEEDS. 
AFTER THE VEHICLE WAS IMPOUNDED AND EVERYBODY 
LEFT HE THEN STARTED TO HITCHHIKE. A GENTLEMAN IN AN OLDER 
PICKUP PICKED HIM UP, TOOK HIM UP ON REDWOOD ROAD. HE 
STATED THAT HE WAS HOME—WELL, HE WAS WITH HIS SISTER, 
l-AUDREY, AT THE TIME WHEN I CALLED AUDREY ABOUT 8:00 O'CLOCK 
ON THE NIGHT BEFORE, THAT HE WAS AT HIS SISTER'S RESIDENCE. 
Q ANY FURTHER CONVERSATIONS YOU HAD WITH MR. DRAWN 
THEREAFTER? 
A NO. 
Q DID THE OTHER PEACE OFFICERS COME BACK INTO THE 
ROOM AT SOME SUBSEQUENT TIME? 
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APPENDIX 4 
TRIAL COURT'S PREVENTION^  OF 
IMPEACHMENT OF OFFICER EDWARDS 
I 
2 
I 
4 
5 
6 
1 
Q WHAT TIME WAS THAT? 
A RIGHT AFTER HE CALLED. 
Q SO ARE YOU SAYING THAT THEY HAD ARRESTED WADE 
PRIOR TO THAT? 
A YEAH. 
Q WHO ARRESTED WADE? WAS THAT OFFICER CARVER? 
A YEAH. 
g Q WHAT TIME WAS THAT? 
TIME. I JUST 
MY DAD HAD 
9 A IT WAS ABOUT—I'M NOT SURE ON THE 
JO KNOW THAT—I HAD LEFT AND WENT TO THE STORE 
11 COME OVER AND TOOK ME TO THE STORE. WHEN I CAME BACK WADE 
12 WAS GONE. AND ERNESTINE SAID THAT TWO OFFICERS CAME AND 
13 ARRESTED HIM. 
14 Q OKAY. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT DATE? 
15 A I DON'T REMEMBER THE DATE. BUT t REMEMBER THE 
I« DAY WHEN THE TWO—I MEAN, I DON'T REMEMBER JHE EXACT DATE. 
17
 Q HOW DO YOU REMEMBER THOSE DAYS THEN? 
18
 A . BECAUSE THE TWO OFFICERS CAME OVER AND ARRESTED 
19
 I HIM AT MY HOUSE. 
Q DO YOLT KNOW ABOUT WHAT TIME THATl MAY HAVE BEEN? 
A NO, I WAS GONE. 
Q HAD YOU TOLD—NOW, DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION 
23
 | WITH ANYBODY WHO MAY HAVE CALLED YOU AS TO |THE VEHICLE AND 
WHO IT BELONGED TO? 
A NO. TWO DAYS AGO DETECTIVE EDWARDS CALLED AND 
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SAID HE WAS CALLING ON YOUR BEHALF. 
Q ON MT otriALF? 
A YEAH. AND HE WANTED TO KNOW-
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL NOW, ARE YOU JUST GOING TO 
NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING THESE GUYS SAY? I MEAN, THIS IS 
VIRTUALLY ALL HEARSAY. 
MR. VERHOEF: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. OBJECTION; 
HEARSAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SUSTAINED. 
Q CBY MR. VALDEZ) YOU HAD A CONVERSATION WITH 
DETECTIVE EDWARDS? 
A YEAH. 
Q THE OTHER DAY? 
A YEAH. 
MR. VALDEZ: THAT'S ALL I HAVE FOR NOW. 
JUDGE YOUNG: CROSS-EXAMINATION? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. 
Q 
A 
Q 
OR DID 
A 
Q 
VERHOEF: 
YOU SAY ROSEMARY MAR BORROWED YOUR CAR? 
YEAH. 
AND SHE DOES THAT QUITE FREQUENTLY, DOESN'T SHE, 
SHE? 
NO. 
NO? WAS THAT THE ONLY TIME SHE BORROWED YOUR 
5<t J 
APPENDIX 5 
MS. HORN'S IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
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MICKI HQRN, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, 
HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WA|S EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VERHOEF: 
Q STATE YOUR NAME FOR 1|HE RECORD, PLEASE. 
MICKI HORN. 
HOW OLD ARE YOU, MICljl? 
20. 
WHERE WERE YOU EMPLOYED DURING AUGUST OF 1988? 
PAYLESS SHOE SOURCE pN 3500 SOUTH AND 5710 WEST. 
THAT'S IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, IS IT? 
I THINK IT MIGHT BE IN MAGNA. 
IT'S INSIDE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY LIMITS. 
OKAY. 
AND DID ANYTHING UNUSUAL HAPPEN ON AUGUST 21ST 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
OF 1988? 
A 
Q 
YEAH. 
WHY DON'T YOU DESCRIBE TO THE JURY WHAT YOU WERE 
DOING WHEN THIS UNUSUAL EVENT HAPPENED? 
A WELL, I WAS VACUUMING THE FLOOR OF PAYLESS. 
YOU WANT ME TO TELL THE WHOLE STORY? 
Q WAS THERE ANYONE ELS£ WITH YOU? 
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YEAH, THERE WAS ANOTHER CLERK. 
WHAT WAS HER NAME? 
JULIE LUND. 
WAS THERE ANY OTHER CUSTOMERS IN THE STORE? 
NO, THERE WASN'T. NOT AT THAT TIME, NO. 
WHAT HAPPENED? 
I HAD MY BACK TO THE FRONT DOOR AND I HEARD THE 
DOOR OPEN. I LOOKED OVER MY LEFT SHOULDER AND SOMEONE WAS 
COMING AT ME, NYLONS ON THEIR HEAD, AND A SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN, 
AND THEY GRABBED MY LEFT ARM AND SPUN ME AROUND AND WALKED 
ME OVER TO THE COUNTER AND TOLD ME TO GIVE THEM ALL THE 
MONEY. 
Q CAN YOU RECALL HIS EXACT WORDS? 
A JUST OPEN THE REGISTER AND GIVE ME ALL THE MONEY. 
Q YOU SAID HE HAD A GUN WITH HIM? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT KIND OF GUN? 
A I THINK IT WAS A SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN. 
Q OKAY. WHAT DID HE DO WITH THAT SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN? 
A HE POINTED IT AT US AND TOLD US WE BETTER DO 
WHAT HE SAID. 
Q WHAT ELSE DID HE SAY? 
A HE SAID THAT—WELL, I STARTED—WHEN HE STARTED 
TELLING ME TO GET INTO THE REGISTER I STARTED TO PUSH THE 
BUTTONS TO GET INTO THE REGISTER AND I WAS NERVOUS. AND 
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I WAS HITTING THE WRONG BUTTONS AND IT WAS MAKING A NOISE 
LIKE THAT. AND HE SAID TO ME, I SWEAR, IF YOU SET OFF THE 
ALARM I'M GOING TO BLOW YOU IN HAliF, I'M GOING TO CUT YOU 
IN HALF IF YOU SET OFF THAT ALARM 
Q WHERE WAS JULIE AT THE JTIME YOU WERE AT THE CASh 
REGISTER? 
A JULIE WAS ON THE FLOOR. JULIE HAD WALKED OVER 
AT SOME POINT AND HE PUT HER ON THE FLOOR, TOLD HER TO GET 
I 
IN THE SAFE AND GIVE HIM ALL THE MpNEY OUT OF THE.SAFE. 
SO SHE WAS ON THE FLOOR PUTTING THE MONEY IN THE BAG. 
11 I Q SHE WAS ON THE FLOOR ON HFR HANDS AND KNEES 
12 GETTING MONEY OUT OF THE SAFE? 
13 A CTHE WITNESS NODS HER H^AD IN THE AFFIRMATIVE). 
U Q WHAT KIND OF BAG WAS IT: 
t5 A I THINK IT WAS LIKE A GftEEN OR A BLUISH, MAYBE 
16
 A CORDUROY. I CAN'T REMEMBER THE B>G VERY WELL. 
17
 | Q WAS THIS A BAG THAT MON$Y WAS MAINTAINED IN? 
A EXCUSE ME? 
Q WAS THIS A BAG THAT MONEY WAS KEPT IN, LIKE A 
MONEY BAG? 
A THE BAG SHE WAS PUTTING llNTO HIS BAG. 
Q YES. 
23
 | A YEAH, THEY WERE VALLEY BANK DEPOSIT BAGS. 
Q DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY WAS PUT INTO THAT 
BAG? 
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A I DON'T. I KNOW THERE WAS PROBABLY AT LEAST 
THREE DEPOSITS BUT I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH EXACTLY. 
Q DID YOU EVER GET THE TILL OPENED? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU TAKE MONEY OUT OF THE TILL? 
A YEAH, I TOOK ALL THE MONEY OUT AND HANDED IT 
TO HIM. 
Q HOW MUCH WAS THERE? DO YOU KNOW? 
A PROBABLY THREE TENS AND A FEW FIVES AND SOME 
10 ONES. I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY TWENTIES IN THE DRAWER. 
!1 THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A COUPLE BUT IT WAS AGAINST POLICY 
12 SO I DOUBT IT. 
13 Q YOU INDICATED THIS PERSON WAS WEARING A MASK. 
14 WHAT KIND OF MASK WAS IT? 
15 A THERE WAS TWO NYLONS. I THINK THERE WAS A BEIGE 
1* NYLON AND A PINK NYLON. 
,7
 I Q WAS THIS PULLED OVER HIS OR HER HEAD? 
A YEAH. 
Q I TAKE IT IT WAS A MALE AS OPPOSED TO A FEMALE? 
A YES, A MALE. 
Q AND HOW COULD YOU TELL THAT? 
A BECAUSE, HE WAS MALE. 
23
 | Q AFTER YOU GOT THE MONEY OUT OF THE TILL WHAT 
DID YOU DO WITH IT? 
A I HANDED IT TO HIM. 
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Q DID HE SAY ANYTHING ELSE OR DO ANYTHING ELSE? 
A JUST ABOUT THAT TIME ANOTHER TWO CUSTOMERS CAME 
INTO THE STORE AND THEY WALKED OV^R ONTO THE BACK AISLE 
^HD HE WAS JUST POINTING HIS GUN AT ME AND HE SAID, YOU 
BETTER GET RID OF THEM, GO GET RID OF THEM. AND I SAID, 
*HAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO WITH THEM? HE SAID, JUST GO GET 
RID OF THEM AND GO NOW. SO I WALKED ON OVER TO THE LAST 
AISLE WITH THEM WHERE THEY WERE. 
Q DID THE CUSTOMERS SAY (^ NYTHING TO YOU ABOUT WHAT 
WAS HAPPENING? 
A THEY DIDN'T KNOW. SEE, HE WAS BEHIND THE—HE 
WAS BEHIND THE REGISTER WHEN THEY WALKED IN AND I DON'T 
THINK THEY SAW HIM. I THINK HE WAS KNEELING DOWN WHERE 
JULIE WAS. 
Q DID YOU EVER GET A LOOK AT THIS INDIVIDUAL'S 
FACE? 
A YES, I DID, A GOOD LOOK. 
Q WHEN? 
A WHEN HE WAS POINTING THE GUN AT ME TELLING ME 
IF I SET OFF THE ALARM AND HE WAS GOING TO BLOW ME IN HALF 
I WAS LOOKING RIGHT AT HIS FACE THE WHOLE TIME. 
Q THAT WAS THROUGH THE N^ YLON STOCKINGS? 
A YES. 
Q SOME TIME LATER YOU WERE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE 
rN A LINE-UP PROCEEDING ABOUT SEPTEMBER 29TH. 
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A YEAH. 
Q DO YOU RECALL DOING THAT? 
A YES. 
Q WERE YOU ABLE TO PICK OUT ANY INDIVIDUAL IN THAT 
LINE-UP? 
A NO, NO I WASN'T. THEY SAID IF I WEREN'T SURE 
WRITE IT ON THE BACK AND I WROTE "ONE" ON THE BACK, BUT 
I COULDN'T DO IT THAT WELL. 
Q WAS MR. DRAWN IN THAT PARTICULAR LINE-UP? 
A YEAH, I THINK. IT'S HARD TO SAY. I WAS HAVING 
A HARD TIME THAT DAY. 
Q WHY DON'T YOU EXPLAIN TO THE JURY WHAT KIND OF 
HARD TIME YOU WERE HAVING? 
A I HAD A 12-MONTH OLD BABY WITH ME IN A STROLLER 
AND SHE WAS OFF TO THE SIDE OF ME AND AS SOON AS WE WALKED 
IN SHE WAS GETTING REAL ANSY. SHE PICKED UP HER BOTTLE 
AND THREW IT DOWN AND I WAS TRYING TO KEEP HER QUIET WHILE 
I WAS TRYING TO WATCH THE LINE-UP. AND WHAT THEY DID IS 
HAVE ONE PERSON COME FORWARD AT A TIME AND TURN AND STUFF 
AND SHE WAS JUST— 
MR. VALDEZ: I AM GOING TO OBJECT TO THAT. I 
THINK THE QUESTION, THE ULTIMATE QUESTION IS, WERE YOU ABLE 
TO PICK ANYBODY OUT OF THE LINE-UP AND SHE SAID NO AND SHE 
WAS — 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, YOU'VE RENDERED YOUR 
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1 I OBJECTION. YOUR OBJECTION'S SUSTAINED. SHE'S INDICATED 
2 I WHAT SHE WAS DISTRACTED BY AND THAT'S SUFFICIENT. 
3 I Q CBY MR. VERHOEF) HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE SINCE 
4 THAT LINE-UP ON SEPTEMBER 29TH TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT MR. 
5 DRAWN? 
6 A NO, I HAVEN'T. 
7 Q WERE YOU IN COURT THIS MORNING OR SEE MR. DRAWN 
8 THIS MORNING? 
9 A OH, YEAH, THIS MORNING, YES. 
10 Q AND WHY DON'T YOU TELL THE JURORS ABOUT WHAT 
IT YOU OBSERVED THEN. 
12 MR. VALDE2: I AM GOING TO OBJECT AT THIS TIME, 
13 YOUR HONOR. HE'S ASKING FOR AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION. 
H THERE'S ALREADY BEEN AN OBJECTIVE ATTEMPT TO MAKE AN IDENTI-
'5 | FICATION. THAT'S WHAT A LINE-UP IS FOR. NOW, OBVIOUSLY, 
MR. DRAWN IS THE ONLY DEFENDANT HERE. 
17
 | JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, YOUR OBJECTION HAS BEEN HEARD 
18
 I AND IS OVERRULED. IF SHE HAS ANY INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION 
19 
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SHE CAN TESTIFY TO IT. 
Q CBY MR. VERHOEF; WOULD YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN TO 
THE JURY WHAT YOU OBSERVED THIS MORNING? 
A WELL, WHEN I WALKED IN I SAT DOWN AND HE TURNED 
AROUND AND IT HIT ME LIKE A TON OF BRICKS. I RECOGNIZED 
HIM. AND THAT WAS IT. AND EVERYTHING ABOUT HIM—THE 
FEATURES — I JUST . . . IT WAS HIM. I JUST COULDN'T—I 
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1 DON'T KNOW. BUT I RECOGNIZED HIM. THE WAY HE MOVED, THE 
2 WAY HIS BACK WAS OVER, THE WRINKLES ON THE FOREHEAD, HIS 
3 NOSE, EVERYTHING. 
4 Q DRAWING YOUR ATTENTION BACK TO AUGUST 21ST OF 
5 1988 IS THERE ANYTHING THAT HAPPENED THAT YOU HAVEN'T'TOLD 
6 THE JURY WHAT HAPPENED INSIDE THE STORE? THAT YOU HAVEN'T 
1 TOLD THE JURY YET. MAYBE I'LL REPHRASE THAT. 
8 DID MR. DRAWN OR DID THAT PERSON LEAVE AFTER 
9 HE GOT THE MONEY FROM YOU AND JULIE? 
10 A WHEN I WAS ON THE BACK AISLE TRYING TO TALK TO 
11 THE CUSTOMERS THAT'S WHEN HE LEFT. 
12 Q AND THEN WHAT DID YOU DO? 
13 A AFTER HE LEFT? 
14 Q AFTER HE LEFT. 
15 A THE CUSTOMERS HURRIED UP AND LEFT BECAUSE THEY 
,6
 KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON AND THEN THEY RAN OUT. AND THEN 
17
 I I WALKED OVER AND CALLED THE 911. 
Q AND THEN SOMEONE RESPONDED? 
A YEAH. 
Q A POLICE OFFICER CAME OUT? 
2 1
 | A YES. BETWEEN THE TIME—RIGHT WHEN I WAS ON THE 
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PHONE ANOTHER LADY CAME IN. 
Q WHO WAS THAT LADY? DO YOU KNOW WHO THAT WAS? 
A I KNOW HER. AND I CAN'T REMEMBER HER LAST — 
I THINK HER LAST NAME IS CONWAY. 
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